Excellent post by Michael Cohen putting the US war on terror in a broader context.
Sometimes it’s worth putting American foreign policy – and the military decisions we have made and continue to make since 9/11 – in a proper and sobering context.
Eight years and two months since America was attacked on September 11th, and 3,000 Americans were killed, the United States has approximately 168,000 soldiers stationed in two Muslim counties, In neither of these countries is there any al Qaeda presence – and there has not been any such presence since 2002. Indeed, since the fall of 2001, al Qaeda has not launched a single major attack on US targets or the US mainland.
Yet, instead of having a national debate on how we got ourselves into such a bizarre and pointless predicament — and squandered so many lives and so many billions of dollars in the process — the current debate in Washington is focused on how many more troops we will send into harm’s way to pursue an enemy that is down to about 200 core operatives.
Do you ever get the queasy feeling sometimes that somewhere in a cave in Pakistan, Osama bin Laden is having a bit of a chuckle about this?
My Thoughts
1) 200 people! Yes, that’s the consensus on how many people the “al-Qaeda organization” has as its disposal in either Pakistan or Afghanistan. Yet this number is rarely cited in debates about US policy in Afghanistan. I can’t figure out why this is the case.
For my part, I’ve long argued that the security threat posed by AQ has been significantly exaggerated. After all, we shouldn’t confuse, as many people do, the BANG of the 9/11 operation as a sign of al-Qaeda’s organizational prowess but rather a sign of American CT neglect. Let’s face it — CT wasn’t a big priority before 9/11 (with the exception of a few dedicated individuals); those 19 guys, many of whom were known to have connections to al-Qaeda could wander around the US untouched for two years.
None of that could ever happen now. It took a serious punch in the face for the US to wake up, something that is quite consistent with insular America’s historical approach to dealing with threats: ignore, pretend they don’t exist… but when attacked the US becomes like a wounded or angry Tiger that responds with a vengeance and is almost impossible to stop. The most obvious case is Pearl Harbor. I mean seriously, if there’s one place in the Pacific that would be an extremely obvious target for the Japanese to attack, where would it be? The Naval bases at Pearl Harbor. So what does the US do? It lines its battleships up in a row so that the Japanese can take them out easier.
But once the US was aroused and entered the war with a vengeance, the War in the Pacific was essentially decided. And the same thing is true with the war against al-Qaeda. Before 9/11, America was like a sleeping dog, and largely ignored the threat of terrorism. After 9/11 everything changed and CT becomes the top security priority of not only the US but just about every country in the world.
Make no mistake about and this is a point that’s ignored by those advocating escalation in Afghanistan but a few hundred loosely organized individuals, no matter how fanatical, are no match for the combined resources of all the world’s governments. I would bet that for every person and dollar dedicated to CT before 9/11, there are now 10. Is it a coincidence that there have not been any major al-Qaeda attacks against US interests? I don’t think so.
Personally, I just don’t see the relationship between the number of US soldiers in Afghanistan and stopping the AQ threat. What’s far more important to me is how many people are sitting at desks in DC or Paris or London focusing solely on stopping al-Qaeda.
When Japan didn’t win the war on 7 December 1941, they lost the war. There was no chance they could ultimately compete with the resources America could mobilize and transport into the Pacific arena. Same thing applies today. When al-Qaeda didn’t destroy the US on 9/11, the war’s conclusion was foregone. In my view, as long as the US keeps maintaining strong CT capabilities, as it is currently doing, the al-Qaeda threat will slowly disappear.
2) I’m pretty certain that future historians will describe the US reaction to 9/11, especially the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as totally unnecessary overreactions. The 2003 Iraq war is obvious. But now we’re talking about making another significant committment to Afghanistan. For what? To fight a group of 200 individuals?